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Public Funding for Religious Schools: dif culties and
dangers in a pluralistic society

LAURA S. UNDERKUFFLER

In the United States, payment of public tax money to religious institutions—
including religious educational institutions—has traditionally been subject to rigorous
restraints. Interpreting the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, the
Supreme Court has long held that state-mandated  nancial support of religious institutions tends to corrupt both religion and government, and is a violation of conscience for
those who must fund religions with which they may bitterly disagree. Recently, advocates
of state aid for religious education have attacked these principles, arguing that they fail
to recognise the religious tolerance that American society has achieved. This article defends
the traditional restraints. It argues that Americans in fact embrace a limited form of
religious diversity, one that tends to be tolerant of familiar, mainstream religious groups,
but is distinctly intolerant of others. Indeed, recent polls indicate that the equal funding
of all religious groups—as the Constitution’s principle of equality would demand—is
highly controversial and supported by few Americans. It is argued that traditional
restraints on public funding of religious institutions in the USA are rooted in a
fundamental truth: that religious differences in pluralistic societies are often deep, divisive,
and volatile, and that the  nancial enmeshment of religion and government serves neither
religion, government, nor the atmosphere of tolerance upon which diverse societies depend.
ABSTRACT

I. INTRODUCTION
The idea of state funding for religious elementary and secondary schools implicates
some of the deepest tensions that run through the general  eld of church–state
relations. In any setting in which public money is paid to religious institutions, concerns
about the enmeshment of religion and government are presented. When—in addition—
the institutions to be funded are elementary and secondary schools, the problems are
multiplied. In addition to the usual concerns, there are con icting convictions about the
rights of parents to direct the schooling of their children, and the belief that schools are
civic institutions which must work toward the inculcation of civic values and civic
ideals. The passions that accompany such issues are intensi ed when religious pluralism threatens the con dence of parents and other citizens that the values that the state
wishes to inculcate, or that religious schools will teach, are compatible with their own.
As a society with historical and increasing pluralism, the United States has long
grappled with these issues. The political and legal cultures in the United States have
long proclaimed the sanctity of religious freedom, the importance of parental rights,
and the role that educational institutions play in the inculcation of civic values. Yet how
all of these goals can be simultaneously realised has been anything but clear.
ISSN 0305-4985 print; ISSN 1465-3915 online/01/040577-16 Ó
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In recent years, the First Amendment to the United States Constitution has provided
the most important battleground for struggles among competing visions of religious
freedom, parental rights, and educational guarantees. This Amendment, which guarantees the free exercise of religion and prohibits the establishment of religion by government, determines the final, national standard to which all governments—federal, state
and local—must adhere. Since 1940, the United States Supreme Court has issued more
than thirty important decisions dealing with the religious freedom guarantees of the
First Amendment in educational settings. These cases have involved issues as diverse
as publicly provided books for religious-school students, the conducting of prayer in
public schools, the application of compulsory education laws to religious objectors, and
objections to the teaching of religiously based or secularly based curricula in public
elementary and secondary schools.
The restrictions that the Supreme Court has imposed when resolving these con icts
have not always been received with universal acceptance or acclaim. Members of
religious communities, in particular, have resisted ideas that ‘God has no place’ in
public schools or that private religious educational institutions should not be funded on
a par with secular ones. In the past, resistance was largely con ned to the advancement
of plans which were (advocates hoped) factually distinguishable from previously invalidated ones. Very recently, however, advocates for state funding of religious schools
have launched a far more fundamental challenge to the Court’s previously imposed
restrictions, attacking—in particular—the idea that religious beliefs and religious institutions involve special dangers and require special protections that justify the exclusion
of religious schools from state funding schemes.
In order to understand the posture of these issues in the United States, it is necessary
to have some awareness of the historical record upon which First Amendment law has
been constructed. From the time of the Supreme Court’s  rst important First Amendment case dealing with an alleged establishment of religion by government [1], the
history which surrounded the adoption of the First Amendment has been an important
judicial starting point for understanding the Constitution’s vision of church-state
relations. Indeed, of all areas of constitutional inquiry, questions of church-state
relations have been most closely tied—traditionally, at least—to historical understandings.
Although Americans often believe that the American colonies were characterised by
an atmosphere of religious freedom, the reality was in fact quite different [2]. Although
many individuals came to North America in pursuit of religious freedom for themselves,
rarely did they extend that ideal to others. In the 17th and 18th centuries, religious
oppression and persecution characterised virtually all of the American colonies. Quakers, Baptists, Roman Catholics, Jews, and Unitarians were particular targets for persecution. Criminal penalties, civil disabilities, and other sanctions were imposed if
individuals persisted in the exercise of forbidden faiths, refused to af rm the tenets of
the dominant faith, or otherwise offended majority religious sensibilities. Citizens were
also taxed for the support of established Christian churches, a practice which engendered particularly bitter opposition.
By the time of the American Revolution, religious dissenters could be found throughout the colonies. In the colony of Virginia, for instance, nearly two-thirds of its citizens
were dissenters by the time that independence was declared. As the numbers of
religious dissenters grew, struggle against all forms of religious establishment intensi ed. Dissenters were vocal and stridently partisan, and merged their cries for
religious freedom with the cries for political freedom that were sweeping the colonies.

Public Funding for Religious Schools

579

Despite widespread agitation against the existing religious regimes, the Constitution
as originally drafted and submitted to the states for rati cation contained only one
religious freedom guarantee: that no religious test-oath would be required for any
federal of ce [3]. The omission of a more extensive guarantee is generally attributed to
the framers’ view that the national government simply had no role whatsoever to play
in church–state relations—that issue remaining, in this view, the province of state
governments. However, many delegates to state ratifying conventions did not wish to
leave such an important issue to simple negative implication; they demanded, as a
condition for rati cation, that protection against religious oppression by the newly
formed federal government be more explicitly guaranteed. As a result, the First
Amendment to the Constitution was drafted and rati ed. This Amendment states that
‘Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof …’ [4]. For many years, it was assumed that this Amendment
restrained the federal government, and the federal government only. It was not until the
1940s that the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment were
held by the United States Supreme Court to constrain state governments as well [5].
As a result of this history, and subsequent Supreme Court interpretations of it,
several principles involving the meaning of religious freedom have become entrenched
as a matter of First Amendment law and public understanding. First, religious toleration and freedom of conscience are viewed as essential characteristics of a free society,
to be recognised—and enforced—by all levels of government. Second, all persons—religious and nonreligious—must be treated equally by law. Third, government must
not—through its policies or practices—establish a particular religion to the exclusion of
others. There must be institutional separation of church and state.
Stating these principles is one thing; implementing them is another. How these
principles should be implemented in particular settings has engendered great dif culty
and controversy. This is particularly true where the settings involved are elementary
and secondary schools.
II. THE RELIGION CLAUSES OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT: EXISTING
PRINCIPLES
The religion clauses of the First Amendment—one which guarantees free religious
exercise, and the other which prohibits the establishment of religion by government—
seem, at  rst glance, to be analytically separate guarantees. The Free Exercise Clause
seems, by its terms, to protect individual activities from government: space is created, by
this guarantee, for free religious exercise and free religious belief. The Establishment
Clause, on the other hand, seems, by its terms, to concern the activities of government
itself: government is precluded, by this guarantee, from the establishment of particular
religious doctrines or particular religious creeds.
The separability of these guarantees quickly becomes dif cult, however, on both
theoretical and practical levels. In some situations, the guarantees can be seen as
reinforcing the same values: for instance, we prohibit the establishment of religion by
government in order to protect its free exercise by other (dissenting) individuals. In
other situations, the guarantees are clearly at odds. For instance, the protection for
religious exercise—and only religious exercise—seems, on some level at least, to be an
establishment of religion (in a generic sense) by government. Because such intertwined
considerations are particularly acute in school funding cases, I will  rst brie y sketch
existing doctrinal outlines of both Free Exercise and Establishment Clause guarantees.
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Free Exercise of Religion
The importance of free religious exercise, and its protection from infringement by
government, are bedrock themes in First Amendment jurisprudence. The Supreme
Court has repeatedly stressed the strength of this constitutional guarantee, stating, for
instance, that ‘[f]reedom of thought, which includes freedom of religious belief, is basic
in a society of free men.’ [6]
Religious exercise may be comprised of belief or action; and although belief may be
protected absolutely, action obviously cannot [7]. Important state interests will often
con ict with actions that are claimed to be compelled by religious imperative, and
sometimes the maintenance of civil society will require that state interests prevail.
Under the Court’s traditional test—consistently applied until the last decade—a particular act was protected as religious exercise if it was required by a central religious
belief, was substantially burdened by a government action, and was not outweighed by
a compelling state interest [8]. Under this test, substantial protection was afforded to
claimed religious exercise when pitted against state laws. For instance, in a ruling which
was (perhaps) the high water mark for this test, the Court held that Amish religious
beliefs which required the discontinuance of a child’s education after the eighth grade
of elementary school must be given precedence over the state’s competing interest in
universal childhood education [9].
The compatibility of the compelling interest test with the realities of governing a
complex, pluralistic society was, however, always a serious issue; and in two cases
decided a decade ago, the Supreme Court abruptly shifted course. In these cases, the
Court held that only when an individual is coerced by government to act in violation of
his or her religious beliefs must a compelling government interest be shown. In all other
cases, government need only show that the law has no ‘anti-religious bias’, i.e., that
religious and non-religious individuals and actions are treated equally in intention and
effect. If a law is ‘neutral’ in this sense, the fact that it incidentally burdens religious
conduct presents no First Amendment question [10]. ‘[W]e cannot’, the Court wrote,
‘afford the luxury of deeming presumptively invalid, as applied to the religious objector,
every regulation of conduct that does not protect an interest of the highest order.’ [11]
The abandonment of the compelling interest test for one rooted in the simple
demand for neutrality in law exposes one of the central issues in First Amendment
jurisprudence: the extent to which equal treatment is, in the end, the most important—or
the only—substantive First Amendment guarantee. This is a question which has
become particularly prominent in Establishment Clause controversies, an area to which
we now turn.

Freedom from Establishment of Religion by Government
The principle of ‘freedom from establishment of religion by government’ means—in
some form—the separation of religion and government. Although religiosity is certainly
a permissible characteristic for individuals who serve in governmental capacities—for
instance, the Court has held that a leader of a religious order cannot, on that ground,
be excluded from government service [12]—the Establishment Clause attempts to
maintain some separation of religion and government as a way to accommodate the
natural strains of religious pluralism and to foster tolerance of divergent religious views.
Over the years, the Court has identi ed three forms of establishment of religion by
government that are particularly problematic from a constitutional point of view. These
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are: state favouritism toward particular religious (or nonreligious) groups; the granting
of state  nancial support to religious institutions; and the assumption by religious
institutions of essentially public functions.
Eliminating the  rst form of establishment—that of government favouritism towards
particular religious (or nonreligious) groups—has been a part of the struggle for
religious liberty since the American colonial period. Colonial laws and practices that
favoured members of some religious sects over members of others were bitterly
resented, and the end of such schemes was one of the primary goals of reformers. In
more recent times, the principle of equality among religious groups, and among those
who are religious and those who are not, has been strongly and consistently af rmed by
the Court through  ve decades of Establishment Clause jurisprudence. The Court has
repeatedly stated that the state must favour ‘neither one religion over others nor
religious adherents collectively over nonadherents.’ [13] The reasons are simple. ‘When
the power, prestige, and  nancial support of government [are] placed behind a
particular religious belief, [there is] … indirect coercive pressure upon religious minorities to conform …,’ [14] violating the principle of freedom of conscience. In addition,
state favouritism toward some makes political outsiders of others—leading to political
division and strife, ‘principal evils against which the First Amendment was intended to
protect.’ [15]
This idea of equality is not, of course, without its dif culties. Although it is fairly easy
to prohibit the explicit establishment of a particular religious sect by government,
‘religion in government’ is arguably more than announced institutional af liations. It
may no longer be acceptable for government to pronounce this a ‘Christian nation’, or
to condition bene ts upon the existence (or non-existence) of an applicant’s beliefs; but
vague judicial references to ‘Judeo-Christian principles’ in lawmaking are tolerated, and
the particular values that government routinely implements are certainly more in
keeping with majority religious views than they are with minority ones. Indeed—one
could argue—the idea that nonreligion cannot be preferred to religion in government
policies and practices is impossible to implement, since government-sponsored activities must have some kind of content, which will—inevitably—be aligned with some point
of view. If, for instance, a public school curriculum re ects religious teachings, it
violates the guarantee of equal treatment of all religious groups; if it re ects secular
teachings, it violates the religion/nonreligion equal-treatment guarantee [16].
As the result of such problems, the federal courts have generally rejected the notion
that the mere congruence of the values implemented by government with particular
religions or nonreligious tenets is enough to violate the Establishment Clause. There
must, in addition, be the identity of government with a particular religion or religions,
or the identity of government with hostility to religion or nonreligion, to trigger
constitutional guarantees. Thus, in public school settings, for instance, the leading by
teachers of Bible reading or other religious exercises [17], or the choice of a curriculum
with the attention and effect of advancing particular religious objectives [18], has been
held to violate the Establishment Clause.
The second form of establishment—that of state  nancial aid for religious activities
or religious institutions—has proven to be an area of particularly intractable doctrinal
dif culty. In one of the few clear rules in this area, the giving of unrestricted cash grants
to religious institutions has been held by the Court to be a violation of the Establishment Clause. In Everson v. Board of Education, decided in 1947, the Court declared that
no state can, ‘consistently with the ‘establishment of religion’ clause of the First
Amendment [,] contribute tax-raised funds to the support of an institution which
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teaches the tenets and faith of any church.’[19] In later years, the Court clari ed that
state aid may be given to religious institutions if restricted for use in the performance
of secular services or the conducting of secular activities [20]. Where, however, such
services or activities are ‘subsumed in the religious mission’,[21] or are intended to
‘assure future adherents to [the sponsoring religious organization’s] … particular
faith’,[22] direct monetary grants of state funds for their support has been prohibited.
Because the Court has believed that religious and secular teachings in religious
elementary and secondary schools are—as a practical and legal matter—inextricably
intertwined, the giving of unrestricted cash grants of state funds to such institutions has
long been prohibited [23].
The prohibition upon the direct payment of state funds to religious institutions, when
those funds will be used for religious purposes, is rooted in several serious concerns.
First, the Court has believed that state-mandated  nancial support of the religions of
others is a violation of conscience for those who must pay. Although taxpayers are
routinely required to fund policy choices that the majority determines, and with which
those taxpayers might well disagree, compelled  nancial support of the religions of
others is believed to be a far more intrusive and coercive matter. In addition, the Court
has adhered to the belief that the  nancial enmeshment of church and state ‘tends to
destroy government and to degrade religion.’ [24]. Religious institutions are corrupted
as they scramble for government largesse, and government is undermined as religious
issues become political issues, and political differences become increasingly scored
along religious lines [25].
The extent to which these concerns require the prohibition of ‘indirect’ aid to
religious institutions has proven to be a much more doctrinally dif cult question. The
Court has long recognised that it would be impossible—indeed, undesirable—to exclude religious institutions from public goods and services (such as police and  re
protection) that are provided, of necessity, to others. The provision of basic services
necessary for religious institutions to coexist with others as good neighbors seems to be
simply an exercise in common sense. Where to draw the line beyond the provision of
such basic services is, however, a dif cult question.
‘Indirect’ public  nancial aid to religious institutions—such as the provision of
textbooks, transportation services, or testing services to religious school students—has
traditionally been upheld if the aid is (itself) secular in nature and provides only
‘incidental  nancial bene t’ to the recipient religious institution [26]. The theory seems
to be that if such institutions serve secular as well as religious functions, secular aid can
be used (and con ned) to the secular functions which such institutions perform [27].
The requirement that such aid confer only incidental  nancial bene t is intended to
minimise the  nancial enmeshment of religion and government, with its dangers of
political and social divisiveness and the corruption of both religious and government
institutions.
Whether these tests for indirect aid are workable is open to serious question. If, for
instance, the recipient institution is a religiously af liated elementary school, in which
teaching activities are ‘subsumed in the religious mission’, the idea that religious and
secular functions can be separated—with state aid used only for the latter—is likely a
completely unrealistic one. In addition, prohibited cash (‘direct’) aid and permitted
non-cash (‘indirect’) aid are the same in a very signi cant way: they pay for expenses
that religious schools would otherwise incur, freeing the resources of those schools for
use in other (religious) activities. The assurances that such aid does not ‘supplant’
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services offered in the religious school [28], or that it creates no ‘ nancial incentive [for
individuals] to undertake religious indoctrination’ [29], does not eliminate this reality.
In a very recent case, a plurality of the Court employed a very different model for
approaching state-aid cases. Mitchell v. Helms [30], decided in 2000, involved a
challenge to a federal programme under which computers and other technical materials
and services were purchased with federal money by local school districts, and distributed as ‘loans’ to all schools within the districts’ geographic boundaries, including
religious schools. Six justices voted to uphold the constitutionality of the programme.
Two did so along traditional lines—on the grounds that the aid was itself secular in
nature, and provided only incidental  nancial bene t to religious schools. Four advanced a new approach. They argued that Establishment Clause concerns can be
reduced to a single principle: whether the government action can reasonably be said to
involve government ‘indoctrination’ in religion generally or in a particular religious
faith. If the aid is ‘neutral’—if it is ‘offered to a broad range of groups or persons
without regard to … religion’—then it is unreasonable to conclude that any indoctrination has been done at government behest [31].
The idea that government aid—no matter how massive—can be given to religious
institutions, as long as it is done on a ‘neutral’ basis, is a radical departure from
previously existing Establishment Clause doctrine. Although there were previous cases
in which the neutrality of state aid programmes had been cited as an important factor
in the Court’s decisions to sustain those programmes [32], Mitchell was the  rst case in
which a plurality of the Court indicated that this factor might supplant all of the
requirements for state-aid programmes that the Court had previously established.
Although the plurality distinguished cash grants, citing the ‘special Establishment
Clause dangers’ that they present [33], the plurality’s view that ‘neutrality’ in operation
has a potentially powerful role in Establishment Clause cases is a clear departure from
existing Supreme Court doctrine. Whether a majority of the Court will ultimately adopt
this approach remains to be seen.
The  nal form of establishment—that of the assumption by religious institutions of
essentially public functions—occurs when civic authority and religious authority are
united, in form, or otherwise jointly exercised. The Court has held that ‘the mere
appearance of a joint exercise of … authority by Church and State’ violates the principle
of equality by providing ‘a signi cant symbolic bene t to religion in the minds of some
by reason of the power conferred.’ [34] The fusion of government and religious
institutional authority inevitably results in ‘of cial support of … the tenets of one or all
orthodoxies’ [35], with the violations of conscience and political and social divisiveness
which such favouritism creates.
As these doctrinal summaries suggest, the principle of equality—itself a bedrock
principle of First Amendment interpretation—has long been in tension with other First
Amendment guarantees. To date, the Court’s majorities have endorsed the idea that
equality requires the equal treatment of individuals, regardless of religious identity or
belief, and that it prohibits the alliance of government with any religious sect. Beyond
this point the Court has refused to go. It has refused, in particular, to hold that religion
must be treated on an equal basis with non-religion in all contexts; instead, it has
maintained the view that religion, as a constitutional matter, enjoys special privileges
(religious conscience is protected in ways that other kinds of conscience are not) and
is subject to special disabilities (although secular ideologies can be explicitly and
intentionally adopted by government, religious ideologies cannot). The theoretical
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underpinning of these holdings is the belief that religion is ‘different’ from other
(secular) beliefs. Very recently, advocates of state funding for religious schools have
challenged this premise. It is to that challenge that we now turn.
III. THE NEW ‘EQUALITY’ CHALLENGE
Emboldened by the plurality opinion in the Mitchell case, and polls that indicate at least
some degree of public support for state funding of religious education, advocates of
state aid for religious elementary and secondary schools have launched a recent and
vigorous offensive along the following lines. They argue that we must reconceive our
understanding of Establishment Clause jurisprudence, and the factual premises upon
which it stands. Traditional concerns about the effects of state funding of religious
institutions do not, they argue, re ect the political and social conditions that now exist
in the United States. Although there may have been periods in American history when
public funding of religious institutions posed particular dangers, requiring—as a result—extreme prophylactic measures, those conditions do not characterise American
society today. Today, they argue, religion is seen as no different from other deep
personal commitments that individuals hold, and religious tolerance is an accepted part
of political and social life. For instance, there is, under current conditions, nothing
more inherently coercive or offensive to taxpayers about the funding of the religions of
others, than there is about the funding of any other activities or programmes with which
taxpayers disagree. Concern about the corruption of religious or government institutions from state-aid programmes is also argued to be an antiquated idea, which ignores
the sophistication of these institutions. In the view of these advocates, the most
important and enduring First Amendment value is freedom of individual choice in
religious matters, and the equal treatment of religious and secular educational institutions by government. When government simply supports—in a neutral and evenhanded manner—those religious and secular educational institutions that parents and
students independently choose, the opportunity for free religious exercise is maximised,
and discrimination against religious persons—for their choice of religious schools—is
eliminated.
These challenges are powerful, at face value. The ideas that 18th-century concerns
do not necessarily describe 21st-century conditions, and that free religious exercise and
the avoidance of discrimination are the most important principles in our understandings of First Amendment guarantees, have great intuitive appeal. Should our ideas
about the funding of religious educational institutions be reconceived along these lines?
Let us examine these ideas more closely.
The idea that the coerced funding of religion is no different from the coerced funding
of other institutions or activities strikes at the heart of the idea that religion is
‘different’—that it has particular value and particular power in human lives. Previously,
political and judicial decisionmakers have assumed that the special character of religion
requires both its special protection (in the form of protected ‘free exercise’) and its
special disabilities (in the form of its institutional exclusion from government).
Is this assumption no longer true? In particular, should the idea that compelled
taxpayer funding of the religions of others in ames no particularly dangerous or divisive
passions now be the assumption that undergirds our understanding of church–state
issues? Is—for instance—the prospect of government funding of religious schools no
more divisive, or disturbing, than a decision to fund the National Gallery of Art or the
Boy Scouts [36]?
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A test of this hypothesis of religious benignancy and religious tolerance as the
dominant view in the United States today was recently posed by a proposal by
President George W. Bush to channel government money to religious charities. As
proposed by his newly opened Of ce of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives, the
Bush plan would greatly expand government funding of sectarian social services,
including those whose programmes include overtly evangelical or ‘conversion-centered’
objectives. The plan is an outgrowth of research which establishes the effectiveness of
religious charities, and the belief that greater government involvement with religious
organisations is something of which the vast majority of Americans now approve.
Expecting enthusiastic support from religious organisations, particularly those associated with the ‘religious right’, the Bush administration was taken aback when conservative evangelical Christians—who have argued for years that current funding restrictions
discriminate against religious groups—reacted with alarm to the Bush plan. Pat Robertson, for instance—a leading evangelical Christian  gure and co-author of the book
‘Compassionate Conservatism’, a phrase which President Bush repeatedly invoked on
the presidential campaign trail—has called the plan ‘appalling,’ because it could result
in government contracts for programmes run by ‘non-Western religions’ and newer
religious movements like the Church of Scientology, the Hare Krishna movement, or
the Uni cation Church [37].
The problem, as commentator Steven Waldman has pointed out, is that many
Americans embrace ‘a limited form of pluralism,’ one that tends to be tolerant of
mainstream forms of Christianity, Judaism, and Islam (religions in the ‘Abrahamic
tradition’), but is decidedly intolerant of others [38]. Indeed, when asked in a recent
New York Times/CBS News Poll whether it would be ‘a good idea for the federal
government to give money to religious organisations to provide social services like job
training and drug treatment counseling’, 66% of the respondents answered
af rmatively. However, when asked whether this would be true ‘if … the government
would be giving money to religious organisations like the Nation of Islam, the Church
of Scientology, and the Hare Krishnas’, only 29% agreed [39]. One can safely speculate
that even fewer would have approved, had radical groups such as the Children of God,
the Branch Davidians, or Wiccans been included in the inquiry. Concerns about the
violation of personal conscience, political divisiveness, and the general power of religion
in human lives might seem like historical artifacts when the government funding plan
is envisioned to fund only ‘acceptable’ or ‘mainstream’ faiths; the situation is quite
different when non-mainstream, non-traditional, even ‘dangerous’ religions are included.
If the problems are serious when the funding of social service organisations is at issue,
they are compounded when one considers the funding of religious elementary and
secondary schools. Most citizens in the United States would probably not feel a
tremendous violation of conscience or other anxiety if they were compelled, through
taxation, to fund mainstream Christian, Jewish, or Islamic schools, as long as those
institutions adhere to the mainstream values which the majority of citizens believe are
critical to the formation of future citizens and with which they feel culturally comfortable. Indeed, when pressed (for instance) about the operation of current religious
school funding proposals, it is these institutions that advocates envision as the recipients
of state funds. What if—instead—recipient institutions adhere to the tenets of radical
sects, or reject the idea of civil authority, or teach ideas of religious hatred or racial
bigotry? Would the funding of such schools be viewed so benignly?
Admitting—perhaps—that the potential for impassioned reactions and divisiveness
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exists, advocates of state funding for religious schools suggest several ways to minimise
these con icts. First, they argue that the practices or teachings of participating schools
could be monitored and controlled, either by denying participation by particularly
offensive groups outright, or by enumerating particular practices and teachings that are
unacceptable in participating schools. For instance, schools run by religious ‘cults’ that
lack particular institutional credentials could be excluded, or schools that engage in
discriminatory practices or that otherwise violate the public policy of the state could be
disquali ed [40].
Such solutions, however, immediately encounter insuperable problems. Any attempt
to distinguish ‘acceptable’ from ‘unacceptable’ religious groups will contravene the
fundamental Establishment Clause principle that the religious beliefs of all persons
must enjoy equal standing before the law. The government could no more exclude
Scientologists, the Uni cation Church, the Branch Davidians, or the Nation of Islam
from a ‘neutral’ school funding scheme than it could exclude them from any other
government bene t or programme ostensibly open and available to all. Once the
general Establishment Clause barrier to the funding of religious groups is breached,
there is no constitutionally acceptable ground for government’s picking and choosing
among religious groups for receipt of government funding. As the Supreme Court has
stated, ‘[i]f there is any  xed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no of cial,
high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or
other matters of opinion …’ [41]. Government choice of particular religious groups
would ‘resurrect the very discriminatory treatment of religion which the Constitution
sought forever to forbid’ [42]. From any point of view, discrimination on the basis of
the identity of the sponsoring religious organisation would clearly be beyond the
constitutional pale.
The idea that government might prescribe or control certain practices, policies, or
teachings of participating religious schools holds super cial promise, but also quickly
breaks down. It might be fairly easy, for instance, for government to prohibit race
discrimination in admissions, on the theory that this is a practice which is easily
monitored, and general constitutional prohibitions on race discrimination outweigh any
competing arguments that religious schools might conceivably make. When other
practices or activities of religious schools are considered, however, the ease of prohibition quickly evaporates. Let us consider, for instance, common practices such as
preferential admissions for co-religionists, or religious or gender discrimination (on
religious grounds) in the hiring of faculty and staff. Where religiously based (but
discriminatory) practices in admissions and hiring are concerned, the conclusion that
state civil rights guarantees would necessarily trump the free exercise rights of those
who run such schools is very far from certain. Indeed, it is precisely because of the
power of free exercise claims that religious institutions enjoy broad institutional exemptions from religious discrimination claims under existing civil rights laws [43].
When one moves beyond speci cally identi ed policies and practices to restrictions
on the content of teaching in religious schools, constitutional problems become even
more severe. Even if religious schools were to accept such government intrusion as the
price for government money—a very unlikely event [44]—such restrictions might well
be held by the courts to be ‘unconstitutional conditions’ [45], or unlawful attempts by
government to condition the receipt of public money on the relinquishment of constitutional rights. Moreover, how such restrictions—even if constitutional—could be
enforced, without continuing and intrusive surveillance of religious classrooms, is
dif cult to imagine. Although religiously based teachings—such as ideas that the
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sponsoring religion is ‘true’ and other religions are ‘false’, that women are by nature
inferior to men, that AIDS is a curse against homosexual sinners, or that racial
hierarchies are ordained by God—might be highly offensive and condemned by many,
their eradication from publicly funded religious classrooms would be very dif cult (if
not practically impossible) to implement.
In view of the extraordinarily dif cult problems involved in controlling the activities
of religious schools, some state-aid advocates have abandoned this approach and
advanced another. Under this new approach, advocates argue that a funding programme can eliminate—through its structure—any legal or publicly perceived connection between the state funding action and the recipient religious schools. Under these
‘voucher’ plans, state grants are given to students and their parents, who independently
choose religious or nonreligious schools. It is argued that since—under this scheme—it
is private choice which acts as the operative or ‘causative’ agent, there is no legal or
practical connection between the state funding action and the ultimate religious use.
Giving vouchers of this sort to students and their parents is no different, it is argued,
from giving welfare cheques to individuals, who can use that money for religious
purposes. Just as the use of welfare money for religious purposes creates no particular
public discomfort, neither will the use of voucher money for religious schools. This plan
will, in addition, minimise the danger of corruption of government and religious
institutions which is usually involved in government funding plans. Because government has no role in choosing religious recipients, there will be no unseemly, and
dangerous, scramble for government largesse.
Let us consider,  rst, the issue of divisiveness. Will the divisiveness that comes from
public funding of religious schools be eliminated through the simple use of ‘private
choice’? Will state payments, under voucher programmes, be seen—legally and practically—in the way that welfare cheques, or state employment cheques, now are?
To answer this question, we must analyse the nature of the underlying transactions.
If the state programme simply involves the payment of state funds to recipient
individuals, without more—if the state has no interest or concern beyond the simple act of
distribution—then the connection between the state act and the ultimate recipient might
be said, quite accurately, to be absent. This is true, for instance, when welfare money
is given to recipients, who may use that money as they like. Although the state is aware
that welfare funds could conceivably be used for religious purposes, it is neither an
anticipated nor an important part of the state’s funding programme that this use will, in
fact, occur. The purposes and functions of the programme—to provide individual
recipients with the means to buy food, housing, and other necessities—are completely
unrelated to this possible, ultimate use. Indeed—far from ful lling the purposes of the
state programme—this use might more readily be seen as in derogation of them.
If, on the other hand, the state programme has—as its purpose and effect—the funding
of particular institutions, the fact that an individual conducts that transfer has little legal
or practical signi cance. Under school voucher plans, for instance, individuals who
receive voucher funds are authorised to transfer that money to religious schools; indeed,
it is the purpose of such plans that students who attend such schools will, in fact, do so.
The plan exists because of the interest that the state retains—not in the act of
distribution to the individual—but in the education that religious schools provide.
Private schools are permitted, under state law, to undertake the public educational task
which the state is otherwise obligated to perform. The state remains, as a result, vitally
interested in the adequate funding of those private schools. Under an educational
voucher plan, the choices that are made by individuals in distributing state funds are
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not made for purposes or ends in which the state has no interest; they are made in the
execution of a programme that is infused—both before and after the individual distributive decision—with vital state concerns.
The idea that the channeling of public money to religious educational institutions
through voucher plans will eliminate the divisiveness which is otherwise involved in
public funding of religious schools ignores the operational realities of such programmes,
and the public’s knowledge of those realities. When it was argued two decades ago that
a state could (through a ‘neutral’ programme) provide textbooks to students who
attended private, all-white academies, because those academies received this aid
through the mechanism of ‘private choice’, neither the public nor the courts were under
any illusion as to what this programme, in fact, was [46]. If state money is given to
students and their parents, who are authorised to transfer this money to religious—including extremely divisive—religious schools, the laundering of this money through
‘private choice’ will not eliminate the problems of divisiveness and coercion which state
funding of these schools involves.
The other reasons for restraint of state-aid programmes—that  nancial enmeshment
of church and state is damaging to both religious and government institutions—is
likewise not eliminated by the simple expedient of private choice in proposed voucher
plans. The true source of the funding involved will be obvious to religious institutions
and government alike. With large amounts of funding—indeed, complete funding—potentially at stake, it is dif cult to see how the scramble of religious institutions for
government largesse, and the merger of political and religious issues, will be eliminated
under such programmes.
A determination that voucher plans do not eliminate traditional Establishment
Clause dangers does not, of course, address the  nal argument of state-aid advocates:
that only the equal funding of religious schools will end the discrimination against
religious persons—for their choice of religious schools—that current law assumes.
Equality and religion must, however, be understood in a context of all fundamental
rights and all constitutional guarantees. As long as ‘religion’ remains something that is
particularly valuable, particularly powerful, and particularly feared, its equal treatment—for both protective and prohibitive purposes—will be impossible. Equality, in
this context, is a false premise. It denies the special character of religion, as a
constitutional category and as a force in individual and collective life.
IV. CONCLUSION
In any society in which religious diversity and consequent hostilities exist, the balance
that is struck among religious freedom, parental rights, and state educational objectives
will necessarily be an uneasy one. The elevation of any one of these to absolutely
protected status will threaten the others, and will jeopardise the complex and delicate
social fabric of which all are a part.
The right of parents to educate their children in religious schools of their choice is a
precious right, and one which is—at this point in American history—beyond legal
challenge. The rights of parents to choose such schools does not, however, mean that
others in society must be compelled to fund that choice. The demand of religiousschool advocates that the public fund religious schools on a par with secular ones
ignores the fact that religion and politics constitute a volatile mixture, which tends to
undermine the atmosphere of tolerance upon which all religiously diverse societies
depend. To believe that the United States is exempt from this truth is to believe that
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we (as individuals) are exempt, somehow, from one of the most consistent lessons of
human history.
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